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The Venezuelan economy is currently undergoing tremendous economic and political 
upheaval. However, of the Latin American countries, it was one of the least damaged 
by the events in 2001 and also made a steady recovery from the Asian crisis of 1997. 
Using a combination of economic indicators, it is shown that Venezuela’s difficulties 
occurred not through contagion from other countries’ problems but through (a) its 
reliance on the oil sector and (b) poorly constructed and ill-sequenced policy. Given 
this, the paper then explores the country’s policy options and asks what can be done 




































In recent years, the Latin American countries making the headlines have primarily 
been Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, each enduring their own economic crisis. Only 
relatively recently has attention been diverted to Venezuela. It too is a country 
experiencing economic and political upheaval yet it is distinctly different from its 
Latin American counterparts. This is a story of missed opportunities by a country 
which could have benefited from investor sentiment in the post Asian crisis period. 
Instead, the evidence suggests that its current difficulties are largely of its own 
making.  
 
Venezuela is rich in terms of its natural resources particularly oil deposits. It is the 
fifth largest oil exporter in the world and hence oil is pivotal in the economy giving it 
tremendous economic power. However, these rich endowments have been both a 
blessing and a curse. In times of recovery, oil resources have quickened the move out 
of recession and into boom. Conversely, growth has slowed in periods of oil price 
decline and the country has been drawn into recession. It follows that oil prices have 
underpinned the relative performance of the economy and determined its fortunes 
over the years.  
 
By contrast, while the Venezuelan economy has been greatly influenced by oil prices, 
it was one of the least damaged by recent events in neighbouring countries and so this 
provokes debate as to what caused Venezuela’s recent problems. This article 
considers Venezuela’s financial vulnerability in the post-1997 era and discusses the 
extent to which it was subject to “contagion” from other countries’ ills. It emerged 
from the Asian crisis and more recently, Argentina’s debt default, in a favourable 
position yet poor policy making and subsequent strikes have been at the root cause of 
the country’s recent ills.  
 
The article is organised as follows. First, there is an outline of the Venezuelan 
economy detailing its political and economic history and describing the important 
policy measures of the last two decades. This provides a background to the next 
section which considers the issue of financial vulnerability. Without providing a 
detailed technical analysis, it considers the degree of vulnerability of Venezuela since 
the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. Also included in this section are some statistics 
relating to other countries in the region to give an idea of how Venezuela lay in 
relation to the other Latin American countries. In the light of this, the article then 
concludes by considering the way forward for Venezuela. It discusses some of the 
options facing the government particularly in terms of capital controls and choice of 




There are two recurring themes in a discussion of Venezuela in the last three decades. 
The first concerns its rich endowments of natural resources. Venezuela is renowned 
for its large deposits of oil as well as coal, iron ore, bauxite and gold. In the early 
1900s it was the world’s largest exporter of oil. Currently, it ranks as the fifth largest  6
and is an OPEC member. This however has led to an over-dependency on its oil 
industry making Venezuela vulnerable to oil price shocks over the years.
1  
   
The second main feature concerns policy making. Disappointing economic 
performance throughout the period has been attributed to a poor choice of policies. 
Coupled with this is a very uneven distribution of the country’s wealth with an 
estimated 85% of the population living in poverty. The end result has led to civil 
unrest and national strikes in recent months, the impact of which is yet to be fully 
realised.  
 
In the last thirty years, the economy has been characterised by periods of boom and 
bust led primarily by oil prices (See Figure 1). The oil price boom in 1973-4 led to 
demand-driven growth in the economy and strengthened the currency against the US 
dollar producing an all-time high in the level of the exchange rate. There was also a 
second round of oil price increases in 1979-80. However, by the mid 1980s, the 
economy was falling into recession following a dramatic fall in world oil prices. As a 
consequence, Venezuela experienced negative growth in the 1979-85 period (as seen 
in the steady decline of the GDP index in Figure 2). In addition, prices were rising. 
Not surprisingly, this was followed by a period of unrest and by late 1980s the 
country was experiencing deep depression and was the recipient of an IMF loan. 
 

























































































Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
As a consequence the government carried out an expansionary policy between 1986 
and 1988. This caused a temporary rise in growth but the effect was short-lived and 
soon inflation was once more on the rise with nationwide shortages developing. The 
exchange rate was pegged at the time and hence this also implied a fall in 
international reserves. 
 
                                                 
1  Cuevas (2002) shows a strong statistical association between Venezuela’s real GDP and the real 
price of oil. He also more disturbingly points out that while this association is still strong, it is not as 
major as it was in the early 1980s and hence Venezuela must not rely on it for its future growth. 
Policy should then be directed at export diversification. 
   7

























































































Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
 
Political unrest continued throughout the 1990s with two attempted coups in 1992 led 
by the future leader, Colonel Hugo Chavez. In 1993, Ramon Jose Velasquez became 
interim president since former president, Carlos Andres Perez, was ousted on charges 
of corruption. Political instability also coincided with falling export prices and a 
major domestic banking crisis which led to deteriorating economic conditions during 
1993 and 1994. Non-oil GDP plummeted, inflation accelerated and once more there 
was a decline in international reserves. The government responded in early 1996 with 
a program of exchange rate measures (later to be replaced by a system of exchange 
rate bands), liberalised interest rates, the abolition of most price controls and an 
adjustment in domestic fuel prices.  
 



























Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
The ensuing recovery in growth was at the expense of high inflation and 
unemployment. This meant that the economy was poorly placed when recession hit in 
1998. Again, this was led by falling oil prices and exacerbated by a high domestic real 
interest rate. Chavez came to power in that year and inherited a country in disarray. 
Real wages had fallen by approximately 23% over the 1990s affecting all sectors of 
the economy including the oil sector and unemployment was on the increase.  
  8
The problem of oil dependence is all apparent when looking at its impact over the 
decade (World Bank Country Brief September 2000). The share of oil GDP in total 
GDP rose from 21% in the early 1990s to 26% in the latter half of the decade. 
Conversely, the share of agriculture in total GDP dropped from 6% in 1990 to 4% in 
1999 while the share of manufacturing fell from 13% to 10%. Furthermore, the share 
of non-oil exports remained below 25% for the period in question thus illustrating a 
lack of export diversification from the oil sector.   
 
On gaining power Chavez implemented an array of economic policies. First, he 
limited public sector wage increases to an average of 17.5% in order to reduce the rate 
of public expenditure. Second, he made cuts in government investment. He also 
increased public sector revenues by lowering the sales threshold of firms subject to 
Value Added Tax. He reduced oil production in order to increase oil prices in 
international markets in an attempt to boost growth. Finally he pledged to maintain 
the exchange rate within a band system. 
 
As a consequence the outlook in 2000 was cautiously optimistic. Oil prices rose 
throughout the period thus giving the government the opportunity to fuel an economic 
recovery. GDP grew throughout the year in contrast to 1999 which saw a fall of 7.2%. 
While Venezuela still faced ongoing problems with inflation, it was considered well 
placed to face the new millennium. However, at this point, poor policy making 
choices were made and the economy was plummeted not just into recession but into 
civil unrest. 
 
The slowdown of 2001 varied across Latin countries. Venezuela faired best of its 
counterparts with growth of 3%. By contrast, Brazil managed between 1 and 2%, 
Mexico saw little or no change and Argentinian output declined for the third year 
running (Krueger, 2002). However, in November 2001 in the midst of the Argentinian 
economic crisis, Chavez put into place sweeping reform laws particularly concerning 
land and the oil industry. The intention was to restructure investment within 
Venezuela. However, essentially it gave the government more control and the right to 
expropriate land deemed unproductive. This led to widespread protests demanding 
among other things the sacking of the state oil monopoly leaders. 
 
Furthermore, in early 2002, at a time when both Argentina and Brazil were 
experiencing exchange rate crises, Chavez floated the currency and disbanded the 
exchange rate controls used to defend the Bolivar. The currency immediately dropped 
25% against the US dollar further exacerbating political tension. The discount rate 
was then raised to defend the currency and reached a high of 50% during January and 
February. The rest of 2002 saw continued upheaval with a general strike and the 
resignation of Chavez. He was subsequently reinstated to office two days after his 
resignation but the unrest continued.   
 
December 2002 saw the start of a prolonged nation wide strike aimed at forcing 
Chavez from office. Its impact was severe. Oil production was estimated by Standard 
and Poor’s to be 3 million barrels per day prior to the strike; 75% of which was 
exported. By mid-January 2003, it was thought to be approximately 500 000 per day. 
This represents a considerable loss given that oil accounts for about half of total 
government revenues and a third of gross domestic product (Hale, 2002).  9
Furthermore, almost all of the country’s foreign investment is aimed at the energy 
industry hence losses were incurred in multiple areas.      
 
The strike continued throughout January 2003 bringing the economy to a standstill. 
Currency trading on the Bolivar was suspended since the central bank was spending 
$70 million per day in an attempt to support the failing Bolivar. In addition OPEC 
agreed on an increase of 1.5m barrels of oil per day to avoid any sharp changes in the 
price of oil as a consequence. On the domestic front, intense discussion then followed 
regarding the next course of action. 
 
Venezuela’s Financial Vulnerability 
 
There is already a vast literature discussing the causes of currency crises. For an 
excellent summary of this extensive literature see Pesenti and Tille (2000). However, 
with the onset of the Asian crisis and also the ongoing problems experienced by Latin 
America, the focus is now on financial vulnerability and finding those key indicators 
which identify whether a country is heading towards crisis. A country is classed as 
financially vulnerable (Perry and Lederman, 1998) if there is a high probability of a 
successful speculative attack against the currency. Without providing a detailed 
technical analysis, this section assesses the degree of vulnerability of Venezuela in the 
post Asian crisis period based on a combination of economic indicators.  
 
In the case of the Asian crisis, financial vulnerability produced symptoms of real 
exchange rate appreciation, export slow-down, rising current account deficits, high 
short term obligations relative to reserves, unhedged currency mismatches and credit 
booms with asset price bubbles. The end results for the Asian countries were insolvent 
financial institutions and a liquidity crisis.   
 
For this reason, the indicators used need to capture both movements in the current and 
capital accounts plus more general measures of the country’s overall health. The 
indicators used to establish the state of the current account are exports, imports and 
the real exchange rate. A fall in exports, increase in imports and real appreciation of 
the domestic currency are indicative of potential problems in the current account.  
 
The indicators used to establish the health of the capital account are (a) the proportion 
of foreign exchange reserves to money stock, M2 and (b) foreign currency exposure 
as a proportion of M2. A drop in reserves is a sign of potential future difficulties in 
the capital account as is a small net foreign asset position. Measures of output, interest 
rate and share prices are also given since a fall in output and the stock market index is 
also indicative of an impending crisis whereas a rising interest rate can be a sign of 
exchange rate difficulties.  A final indicator which is perhaps the most revealing is 
based on the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI). This provides a measure of 
investor sentiment. A large spread is indicative of adverse investor sentiment and a 






Current Account Indicators 
 
As seen in Table 1, Venezuela’s real exchange rate appreciated throughout the 1997-
2001 period indicating a country with potential current account difficulties.
2 However, 
the degree of appreciation slowed between 1999 and 2001 suggesting that the real 
exchange was at least stable. A further investigation of the current account reveals 
export revenues which gained strength rather than fell in the post Asian crisis period. 
Why? To answer this, an extra column has been added to the table showing petrol 
export revenues for Venezuela. Throughout, the period, this has dominated the 
country’s total exports. Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that in the 1998-2000 period, 
world prices rose. Hence it follows that export revenues would follow suit. Import 
revenues remained stable between 1997 and 2000 with a small increase in 2001 but 
nothing of great concern. In short, for Venezuela the gap between its export and 
import revenue increased between the Asian crisis and 2001. In these terms then there 
was not overwhelming evidence of financial vulnerability, just an over-reliance on its 
oil industry for exports. 
 
The opposite may be said of Argentina and Mexico where import revenues 
outstripped exports for the entire period. For Brazil export revenues exceeded imports 
but only by a small margin. However, their real exchange rates tell a very different 
story. For both Argentina and Brazil there is a real depreciation in the exchange rate 
throughout the period. Since both these countries hit economic crisis during this time, 
this warrants further attention. Brazil had considerable success in its policy of 
inflation targeting between 1994 and 1998. Hence while we see evidence of 
inflationary build-ups later in the period, this may explain the trend in the real 
exchange rate. Table 1 also provides figures for CPI. Notably, Argentina experienced 
deflation during this period hence the depreciation in the real exchange rate. Mexico, 
like Venezuela, experienced real exchange rate appreciation thus calling into question 
its financial vulnerability. 
 
Capital Account Indicators 
 
Indicators for the capital account place Venezuela favourably in comparison with its 
counterparts. Consider the proportion of reserves relative to money stock. For 
Venezuela there is a steady decline between the crisis of 1997 and 2001. However, as 
can be seen, the ratio is considerably higher than for the other three countries. One 
might therefore say that this decline is indicative of some uncertainty but nothing in 
comparison with its neighbours. 
 
A further indicator is the degree of foreign currency exposure as seen in net foreign 
assets as a proportion of M2. For Venezuela this actually increased in the late 1990s, 
reaching a peak in 1999 but dropping in the following years. It has, however remained 
positive throughout. This cannot be said of Argentina or Brazil both having 
experienced negative net foreign assets. Mexico’s position is strongest here but 
notably, the change in net foreign assets exhibits volatility. 
  
                                                 
2  The nominal exchange rate is expressed as the domestic price of foreign currency. This means that a 
rise in the index indicates a depreciation of the real exchange rate while a fall is an appreciation.  11
General Indicators 
 





















97 21624  18186  13159  0.865  0.035 
98 17193  12021  14250  0.696  0.043 
99 20190  16295  12670  0.682  0.060 
00 31802  26772  14606  0.637  0.042 
01 27409  22112  16236  0.425    0.026 












97 106.16  299.89  162.99  61.08  45 
98 106.34  407.2  173.02  51.14  60 
99 99.87  503.18  85.59  48.56  38 
00 103.1  584.72  82.89  46.63  38 
01 -  658.01  133.91  46.46  37 













Net Foreign Assets/M2 
97 26370  28553.3  0.288  -0.043 
98 26441  29557.8  0.289  -0.053 
99 23333  24129  0.294  -0.088 
00 26409  22052  0.278  -0.069 
01 26655  19148  0.200  -0.125 












97 114.09  100.68  145.93  104.63  6.63 
98 118.48  101.61  144.17  105.28  6.81 
99 114.47  100.43  104.78  108.84  6.99 
00 113.57  99.48  155.95  113.59  8.15 
01 108.51  98.42  144.16  118.07  24.9 
02 -  -  57.79  -  - 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. The share price index is based on the S&P/IFCG Index 
taken from Datastream. A dash (-) indicates that the data is not available at the time of writing.  12
 














Net Foreign Assets/M2 
97 52994.3  59744.4  0.223  -0.066 
98 51139.9  57743.9  0.184  -0.038 
99 48011  49214  0.207  -0.066 
00 55085.5  55744.7  0.202  -0.079 
01 58222.6  55578.1  0.236  -0.068 













97 106.02  123.78  122.06  98.26  45.09 
98 106.25  127.74  123.01  104.46  39.41 
99 107.09  133.95  53.00  150.59  21.37 
00 107.94  143.37  119.67  158.45  18.52 
01 -  153.2  128.59  181.41  21.43 











Net Foreign Assets/M2 
97 110431  109808  0.259  0.018 
98 117460  125373  0.298  0.040 
99 136391  141975  0.252  0.041 
00 166367  174500  0.300  0.037 
01 158547  168276  0.317  0.081 













97 112.27  162.1  134.72  68.73  21.91 
98 117.76  187.91  155.60  73.54  26.89 
99 122.16  219.08  110.94  62.11  24.1 
00 130.27  239.88  185.28  59.01  16.96 
01 129.91  255.14  181.23  54.49  12.89 
02 -  -  196.33  -  - 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. The share price index is based on the S&P/IFCG Index 
taken from Datastream. A dash (-) indicates that the data is not available at the time of writing. 
 
The share price indices show the same basic pattern for each country, namely a rise 
just prior to the Asian crisis and then a dramatic tumble in 1999. After a further fall in  13
2000, Venezuela then made a recovery in 2001 climbing 61.5% on the previous year’s 
level. The Mexican index having recovered in 2000 fell in the 2000-2001 period as 
did that of Argentina. The Brazilian share price index meanwhile climbed by a modest 
7.5%. At this stage then, Venezuela could have consolidated its gain by prudent 
policy choices and hence seen further increases in its shares in subsequent years. 
However, as the figures show, share prices tumbled in 2002 as a consequence of poor 
policy making and civil unrest. Likewise, Argentina’s market collapsed in 2002 as did 
that of Brazil. Mexico was the only country of this group to experience an increase in 
that year.  
 
This should be viewed alongside the other indicators of interest rate and prices. 
Venezuela experienced an ongoing struggle with inflation as reflected in the 
consumer price index. This managed a steady increase throughout the period matched 
by an equally high discount rate. One may argue that while this is unsatisfactory, it is 
at least stable. Argentina, by comparison maintained a steady price level throughout 
the period matched by a moderate discount rate until 2001. At the time of its currency 
crisis, the interest rate shot up to 24.9%. Brazil and Mexico also experienced 
moderate inflation levels but discount rates which have been both high and volatile. In 
this sense, Venezuela compares poorly with the other three countries.   
 
Disappointingly, GDP figures from the IMF for Venezuela are only available up to 
2000. However, they still show a drop in 1999 but a subsequent recovery in 2000. 
Figures for 2002 and 2003 will also reflect the impact of the nationwide strike and are 
expected to reduce GDP considerably. Argentina’s figures meanwhile show a peak in 
1998 but steady decline throughout the rest of the period. Brazil also shows only a 
very marginal gain with Mexico the only country of the four to have a steady climb 
post 1997. 
 
The evidence thus far suggests that Venezuela felt the impact of the Asian crisis but 
then started to recover thereafter. It also reveals a specific set of problems facing the 
country i.e. its high and persistent level of inflation coupled with an appreciating real 
exchange rate. However, the current conditions in terms of EMBI spreads tell a very 
interesting story and highlight the fact that Venezuela missed an opportunity for 
development in the post Asian crisis period. Figure 4 shows an index of interest rate 
spreads (Emerging Market Bond Indices) on bonds in the emerging markets of Latin 
America for the years 2001-2003. They are recalibrated so that the base year is 
January 2001 thus allowing a comparison to be made across the countries in the 
region. An increase in this index implies that the bond spread is getting larger and 
hence that investor-sentiment in the country is deteriorating. Therefore a rise in the 
index implies an adverse change in sentiment for the bonds of that particular country.  
 
Clearly, at the time of the Argentinian debt default in 2001, the spreads for Venezuela 
and Brazil were not increasing at an excessive rate thus suggesting that they were in 
no immediate danger from speculative attacks. However, by late 2002 indices for all 
of the Latin American countries were on the increase with Venezuela in particular 
demonstrating a sustained fall in investor sentiment. 
 
This tells us two things. First, it confirms the view that investors are learning to 
distinguish between countries in a region in a time of crisis (Vogel, 2001). Second, 
the rise in Venezuelan spreads coincides not with other events in the region but with  14
its own domestic difficulties. Thus the unrest and nationwide strikes have precipitated 
an adverse response from investors. In short, its problems have been country specific.  
 
 





















































Policy: Which Way Forward? 
 
Current policy in Venezuela is based on emergency measures. The Bolivar’s rate has 
depreciated rapidly and hence it has been fixed with a trade ban extended in order to 
try and boost foreign exchange reserves. These have depleted considerably. By 
January 2003, international reserves had dropped to a level of $13.6 billion. Since 
Chavez came to power in 1999 approx $35 billion have left the country with the 
government recently spending up to $70 million per day supporting the currency. This 
has raised concerns of an impending debt default (Venezuela currently has $22.4 
billion of foreign debt) and hence the need to stem this outflow of capital. As a 
consequence, Chavez now plans to put in place controls on financial transactions 
based on the Tobin tax. Clearly, this is an economy in need of some long term policy 
reforms. 
 
A lot has already been written on the potential policy measures for emerging market 
economies in general. However, very little has focused on the specific case of 
Venezuela. Instead of regurgitating the current literature, I focus on how it relates to 
the case of Venezuela. There are two main issues currently up for debate; (a) the 
choice of exchange regime for the country and (b) the use of capital controls. Each of 
these issues has been tackled by Eichengreen (1998, 2002) and the salient points will 
be raised here. 
    15
Exchange Rate Policy 
 
Venezuela faces three basic options. First, it could fix its currency either by a 
currency board or, in the case of Ecuador, dollarising. Second, it can go for complete 
flexibility in the exchange rate (as in the case of Brazil). Alternatively it can opt for 
something in the middle ground. The crucial point noted by Bird (2002) is that the 
choice of exchange rate should reflect the particular country’s characteristics. 
Furthermore, the appropriate exchange rate will differ across time according to the 
circumstances facing that country. This suggests a need to distinguish between 
emerging market economies and not put them all into one category. In doing so, there 
are a number of key features of the Venezuelan economy which may help in 
identifying an appropriate exchange rate.  
 
First, as with many emerging market economies, it is subject to higher exchange rate 
pass through. This means that a change in the exchange rate will impact quickly on 
import prices and hence on to domestic prices and the inflation rate. In terms of 
Venezuela this poses a serious problem since the country is already prone to a high 
and persistent inflation rate implying that it is more sensitive to expected changes in 
prices. The recent depreciation of the Bolivar has been testament to this since it has 
exacerbated an already large inflation rate. This is also an argument against the use of 
a flexible exchange rate in Venezuela at present. Flexible rates are renowned for being 
erratic and fluctuating considerably thus leaving prices vulnerable to volatile 
exchange rate movements. 
 
Second, Venezuela, like others, is commodity price sensitive. Fluctuations in the 
world price of oil have dramatic impacts on domestic prices as has been discussed in 
an earlier section. An upward movement in the oil price level has led to increased 
GDP and the chance for growth. However, the country has also been exposed to sharp 
drops in price plunging it into recession. Clearly, this makes inflation targeting 
difficult and exposes the economy to both inflationary and GDP volatility. 
 
A third feature is that of liability dollarisation. Countries with dollar denominated 
debt but assets in domestic currency suffer severe balance sheet effects as a 
consequence of exchange rate depreciation. This is yet another argument against the 
use of a flexible exchange rate at present in Venezuela. While its exposure is not as 
great as that of Brazil or Argentina (see Table 1), it still poses a considerable problem 
for the country. 
 
Fourth, and perhaps the most vital characteristic at present is the lack of policy 
credibility. It is well documented (Eichengreen, 2002, among others) that countries 
lacking central bank independence and thus credibility are historically those that 
struggle to attain an independent monetary policy. If it is apparent to the markets that 
the government is not committed to fighting inflation (or indeed other pre-announced 
proposals) any shock hitting the country will cast doubt as to the government’s 
willingness to stick to its plans. Firms will thus not react by appropriate price 
changing measures and the desired impact on inflation will not be attained. The 
implication here is that shocks to the system impacting on interest rates, exchange 
rates or international capital flows will have knock-on effects on other financial 
variables thus generating destabilising effects on output.    
  16
This therefore raises the question of what can be done to achieve credibility. There are 
a number of different avenues which Venezuela needs to explore. First, as mentioned 
above is central bank independence. The task is to overhaul the financial system so as 
to attain a central bank whose decision making is absent of political suasion. In 
principle this should be easy. It is, after all, a matter of passing a law establishing 
central bank independence and then appointing appropriate governors to long term 
positions in office. However, in practise this is fraught with difficulty for a country in 
which institutions have been run according to political ideals.  
 
Related to this is the need to demonstrate transparency in policy making in order to 
enhance credibility throughout markets. One possible way forward is to produce an 
Inflation Report as in the case of Mexico and Brazil in order to convince investors 
that the central bank is committed to its policy. However, alongside these measures it 
is also important to reform fiscal policy making. A typical feature of emerging 
markets has been the tendency for free riding whereby federal governments bail out 
debt ridden regions thus undermining their credibility. One of the main problems for 
Venezuela has been the amount of state controlled industry. Indeed, the strikes of 
April 2002 concerned the running of the state owned oil firm, PDVSA. The 
implication here is that any changes in monetary regime should also be accompanied 
by significant fiscal policy changes reining in fiscal spending. 
 
Each of the above features suggests that a flexible exchange rate regime would be 
disastrous for Venezuela at present (as demonstrated by the floating of the Bolivar in 
2002). However this is contradictory to the evidence of the advanced industrial 
countries which predominantly have flexible or near-flexible regimes and apply a 
policy of inflation-targeting. Indeed, the conventional arguments put forward in 
favour of flexible exchange rate regimes suggest that they allow for considerable 
policy flexibility which could be valuable to a country wanting to make systematic 
changes through monetary policy. So why should Venezuela not float? 
 
In short it is an open economy and exposed in terms of its dependence on the oil 
industry to changes in world oil prices. Second, its net foreign exposures, while not 
the worst in the region indicate that it has a lot to lose from currency depreciation. 
Third, its institutions lack credibility. These issues need to be addressed before 
Venezuela can contemplate adopting the exchange rate regime of a high income 
country. In the meantime, there are gains to be made in adopting a hard peg at least in 
the short term. 
 
Countries in crisis are typically ones in which policy credibility has reached an all 
time low. Venezuela would certainly fit into this category. Therefore, the main aim is 
to try and rebuild credibility. A hard peg has a number of advantages; its simplicity, 
transparency and its credibility. With a stable exchange rate, the policy makers could 
set to work solving some of the underlying institutional problems i.e. overhauling the 





Capital Controls  
 
In terms of their popularity, capital controls are back in favour. This has primarily 
been with the success of Malaysia in its use of strict controls following the Asian 
crisis (Jomo, 2002). However, closer to home capital controls in Chile were also 
deemed a success (Reinhart and Smith, 1997). Their imposition reduced the volume 
of capital inflows and lengthened their maturity. 
 
However, again this contradicts the policies pursued elsewhere. Indeed, the other 
major industrial economies have open capital accounts and their currencies are 
convertible for capital account transactions. So why not follow the trend and maintain 
an open capital account in Venezuela?  
 
A completely open capital account is the final step in the long process of developing a 
deep and efficient domestic financial system. Venezuela is nowhere near achieving 
this goal and hence for the moment, one can make a strong argument in favour of 
some form of capital controls. It is generally regarded that capital controls or Tobin 
taxes (as is being proposed in Venezuela) should not be pursued in the long term. 
However there is a role for such controls as a short term interim measure while the 
country builds a deep financial system, upgrades supervision of its institutions and 
reforms monetary and fiscal policies. Their advantages are obvious. However, the 
main disadvantage of such a policy is that it is very costly to implement and 
cumbersome in terms of bureaucracy. Of course, the counter argument for a country 
like Venezuela is that it is accustomed to bureaucracy and hence this should not be an 
awkward transition. 
 
There are however a few words of warning here. The imposition of a Tobin tax or 
other capital control may act as an incentive to deter the all-important policy reforms 
which are badly needed in Venezuela. The key is not to let a capital control hinder the 
process but complement it. 
 
Second is the issue of sequencing. Venezuela clearly has to undergo a dramatic 
change not just in terms of monetary and fiscal policy but also in the setup and 
governance of its institutions. It is therefore crucial that these policies are pursued in 
the correct order. Sadly, it has already paid the price for poor sequencing in its actions 
in 2002. Floating the exchange rate and abandoning controls prior to institutional 
reform proved disastrous particularly as it coincided with crisis in neighbouring 
countries. To quote Eichengreen, “After Mexico in 1994 and Asia in 1997, do we 
really need a third reminder of the dangers of premature and precipitous financial 




Venezuela is a country in difficulty. Aside from ongoing troubles with inflation and 
an over-dependency on its oil industry, it now faces the aftermath of a nationwide 
strike, the effects from which are yet to be fully realised. The changes needed are not 
merely a matter of movements in fiscal or monetary policy stance but instead require 
an overhauling of the whole financial system. This is not something which can be 
achieved overnight. The key to its recovery lies in a long term commitment on the  18
part of the authorities and a willingness to embrace change. Given the current political 
climate of Venezuela this may be easier said than done. 
 
However, the news is not all bad. The evidence has shown that while Venezuela was 
affected by the Asian crisis of 1997, it had a propensity to recover. Similarly, when 
Argentina fell into crisis, investor sentiment did not immediately class it as financially 
vulnerable. The implication here is that Venezuela could be a success if only it would 
make the overdue institutional reforms. This outcome is unlikely given the current 
political climate. However, it is certainly food for thought. 
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